The decision of Greece, and its bankers, to ask Beijing for cash to fund its yawning fiscal deficit should come as no surprise. The Chinese capital is the first port of call for countries and companies that need money.

China has a huge stock of surplus cash, with $2,400bn (€1,702bn, £1,486bn) in foreign exchange reserves, amassed by a decade of largely fixed-exchanges rates, swelling trade surpluses and capital inflows.

China has both the need to diversify the way it invests those funds, reducing their reliance on US Treasuries, and also an interest in leveraging the influence the money brings to its own rising diplomatic ambitions.

It is not just the foreign exchange reserves, which are managed by a body under the central bank, that have been enlisted to fund China's offshore ambitions. On top of a standalone sovereign investment fund, state banks, in various guises, have funded overseas ventures.

The implosion of the western financial system over two years from 2007, along with an evaporation of confidence in the US, Europe and Japan, almost overnight pushed China's global standing several notches higher.

In a few months in early 2009, unconstrained by any serious public debate at home, the Chinese state committed $50bn in extra funding for the International Monetary fund and $38bn with Hong Kong for an Asian monetary fund.

About the same time, state interests extended a $25bn loan to cash-strapped Russian oil companies, set aside $30bn for Australian resource companies and offered tens of billions more to various countries or companies in South America, central and south-east Asia to lock up commodities and lay down its marker for future purchases.

Last September, with western governments and companies still on the backfoot, China readied lines of credit of up to $60-70bn for resource and infrastructure deals in Africa – in Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Kenya.

Not all the money set aside was spent, either because it was not welcome or terms could not be agreed. But Beijing's ability to muster such funds speaks volumes for China's growing financial power.

“China is obviously using its financial muscle to expand its sphere of influence,” said a Beijing-based lawyer who advises Chinese companies.

Such sums might give the impression that China has been throwing its money around with abandon. But after some early loss-making forays, mainly through investments in US and European financial companies, China has become more cautious about where it places its money.

The Chinese system, although far from transparent and democratic, has its own checks and balances, largely in the form of increasingly rigorous internal assessment of investment plans.

Rival state agencies are notoriously jealous and are more than happy to highlight any deals of competitors that have gone bad, internally and through encouraging criticism on the internet.

In the case of Greece, money is not a problem. Buying up to €25bn in Greek bonds is equal to about two weeks' worth of accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in China.

Chinese thinking is that Brussels could not let Greece fail, because the implications for the euro's credibility are too dire. If that line of argument prevails in Beijing, then China may well be a buyer of Greek bonds. In the process, the Chinese may well be buying invaluable political capital in Brussels as well.