Often misread as an expression of national arrogance, “American exceptionalism” denotes a sociological fact. The US differs from other advanced democracies in two respects above all – religiosity and suspicion of state power. The former moved to the centre of American politics in the decade just ended; the latter may well dominate the decade just begun. The lack of trust in government has framed, and weakened, the Obama presidency thus far. And rebuilding trust may well be the administration's most important political task.
Consider the most recent survey conducted by CBS News and The New York Times. Only 19 per cent of respondents – near the record low – said they trusted the government to do what is right all or most of the time. Only 29 per cent thought they had much influence on what the government does, while 78 per cent believed the government to be run by a few big interests, not for the benefit of the people.
Not surprisingly, these sentiments helped shape attitudes about the exercise of public power. Only 35 per cent thought that government should do more to solve national problems, versus 59 per cent who believed it already did too many things better left to individuals and the private sector. Some 56 per cent would prefer a smaller government offering fewer services; only 34 per cent favoured a larger and more active government.
These sentiments are not without precedent in US history. From the beginning, doubts about government have been part of America's cultural DNA. Around the middle of the 20th century, however, it was possible to believe that anti-statism was a thing of the past. Between 1933 and the mid-1960s, the federal government had fought the Great Depression, prevailed in the second world war, contained the Soviet Union, and presided over the greatest expansion of middle-class prosperity in human history. Little wonder that public trust in government reached 76 per cent by 1964.
And then the tide turned. Influenced in part by perceptions of deceit over (and defeat in) Vietnam, trust in government fell to 53 per cent in 1970. After Watergate, it fell again, to 36 per cent, in 1974. After the Great Inflation of the mid- and late 1970s, it collapsed to only 25 per cent by 1980. The economic recovery that began during the Reagan administration in 1983 moved trust back up for a while, but it stood at only 29 per cent on the threshold of Bill Clinton's presidency. After rising again during President Clinton's second term and George W. Bush's first, it fell rapidly after 2004 and stood at just 17 per cent in the weeks before Barack Obama's historic victory.
To the surprise of many – including, one suspects, the incoming administration – Obama's inauguration did little to increase trust in government. While the American people had invested their hopes in a promising young leader, they had not withdrawn their reservations about the institutions from which the change he had promised would have to flow.
Nonetheless, the administration felt compelled early on to continue – and in some cases to adopt – measures that intensified mistrust. Justified as necessary to avert a second Great Depression, the bail-outs of banks, American International Group, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the motor industry appeared to many as costly pay-offs to the very institutions whose ineptitude and recklessness had caused the crisis. The administration made matters worse by suggesting that the stimulus package would cap unemployment at 8.5 per cent, a ceiling that was quickly breached.
