EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia - FT中文网
登录×
电子邮件/用户名
密码
记住我
请输入邮箱和密码进行绑定操作:
请输入手机号码,通过短信验证(目前仅支持中国大陆地区的手机号):
请您阅读我们的用户注册协议隐私权保护政策,点击下方按钮即视为您接受。
FT商学院

EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia

The bloc’s agreed partial embargo may prove to be ineffective as higher prices could compensate for reduced volumes

The aim of economic warfare is to inflict maximum pain at minimum cost. Achieving that is hard when the target is a key commodity producer. The EU’s agreement to ban most Russian oil imports reflects justified outrage at the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. But it may prove to be ineffective.

The problem with oil is that it is traded internationally. Higher prices may compensate Russia for reduced volumes, as US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen argued in April. Equally, customers in the EU and outside it may swap sources of supply in response to price signals, with little ultimate impact on the Russian exchequer.

The lower the level of substitution, the more powerful the partial embargo. Some countries, for example, lack refineries that can process Urals, Russia’s sulphurous main export blend.

That is not a problem for China and India. They have already moved to fill the gap in demand for Russian oil created by self-sanctioning by European refiners and traders. India rarely bought Russian oil in the past. But it emerged as the largest purchaser of Russian Urals crude in April, according to S&P Global.

Asian countries may not take up the full slack in demand for Russian oil, however, fearing retaliatory western sanctions. Capital Economics thinks Russia’s oil exports will fall by a fifth this year, even allowing for a 15 per cent rise in exports to non-western countries. But after factoring in higher prices, the consultancy estimates that Russia’s oil export revenues will be $180bn, a mere $2bn lower than in 2021.

The gap between Brent and Urals crude — currently $31 — may eventually fall in response to substitution. One response from the west may be to ban its insurers from covering tankers carrying Russian oil. Creating friction of a logistical kind is one way of compensating for a lack of it in markets.

Even after the oil embargo is fully phased in next year, it may be more than offset by higher gas prices. The oil embargo reduces Europe’s financial complicity. It will not, by itself, sabotage the Russian war machine.

版权声明:本文版权归FT中文网所有,未经允许任何单位或个人不得转载,复制或以任何其他方式使用本文全部或部分,侵权必究。

马斯克的特斯拉能否继续横跨中美两国?

就在华盛顿对数据安全感到紧张之际,这家电动汽车制造商与一家领先的中国互联网公司就驾驶技术达成了一项协议。

自助餐的奇特新经济

红龙虾陷入困境,但无限量牛排和香槟的豪华盛宴却在蓬勃发展。

抵押贷款改革可能释放出美国的下一轮大规模刺激

房地美希望进入次级房屋净值贷款市场,实现政府、华尔街和消费者的双赢。

美国牛群爆发禽流感引发对下一次全球健康危机的担忧

虽然大流行的风险很低,但科学家们说,有必要对这种病毒进行紧急调查。

人工智能股是否已经过热?

价格已经反映得太多,而且速度太快,这意味着调整的条件已经成熟。

美国股市强劲反弹,劳动力市场降温提振了降息预期

在4月份仅新增17.5万个就业岗位后,期货市场倾向于预计美联储将在9月份降息。
设置字号×
最小
较小
默认
较大
最大
分享×