“If it’s not Boeing, I’m not going,” was long a cherished slogan of the aircraft giant. Not everyone agrees today: French finance minister Bruno Le Maire said this week that he preferred “flying in Airbus over Boeing — my family too, they care about me”. The quip probably reflected often bitter transatlantic rivalries over plane-making. But five years after twin Boeing 737 Max 8 plane crashes killed 346 people, and two months after a door panel on another model blew out mid-flight, the company’s woes seem to be deepening. As the Southwest Airlines CEO has put it, Boeing needs to “get the issues understood and get the issues fixed”.
An initial probe into January’s door plug blowout concluded four bolts meant to attach it had not been fitted. In the months before, Boeing had had issues with misdrilled bulkhead holes and a missing rudder control nut. The mishaps keep coming. The US regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration, warned last week of improperly installed wiring bundles on 737 Max planes. And 50 passengers were hurt when a 787 flying from Australia to New Zealand suddenly plunged, after which Boeing told airlines to inspect switches on 787 pilots’ seats.
The FAA said an audit of Boeing and its key supplier Spirit AeroSystems had found multiple alleged failures to comply with manufacturing quality requirements; it has given Boeing bosses 90 days to draw up a plan to fix quality issues. An expert panel found a “disconnect” between top managers and staff and “inadequate and confusing” safety processes.
Resultant delays in Boeing deliveries are affecting airlines and passengers. Half a dozen US and European carriers have warned that their plans to increase capacity are in doubt. Airline trust in Boeing management and its CEO Dave Calhoun is being sorely tested.
The roots of the problems are well catalogued. A shift in culture after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas in 1997 put financial returns ahead of engineering prowess. The company relied more on suppliers to build parts, and spun off some operations into separate businesses — such as Spirit — as it focused on final assembly. The FAA delegated too much 737 Max safety certification work to Boeing itself. Lina Khan, Federal Trade Commission chair, presents Boeing as a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of “national champions”; turning it into a too-big-to-fail domestic monopoly in commercial aircraft lessened the pressure for innovation and excellence.
Airbus is a European “champion” too, assembled from mergers and aided by state support, and uses a network of outsourced suppliers that also includes Spirit. Yet, while it has made its own past strategic mis-steps, Airbus has avoided the quality and safety traps Boeing has fallen into. In response, the US company has not stood still. It created a board-level aerospace safety committee and a chief safety officer role. It has centralised safety reporting functions; engineers now report to the chief engineer, who reports directly to Calhoun.
But recent months have made clear how much remains to be done. To regain its manufacturing verve, Boeing should bring Spirit back in-house (talks are under way), improve its approach to quality assurance and rebuild relations with squeezed suppliers. Above all, it needs a wider cultural reboot, starting with an overhaul of top management.
Calhoun, a former GE executive, stabilised the company and repaired relations with regulators after the 737 Max 8 crashes. But as a Boeing director since 2009, he was on the board when the crashes happened and — though Covid intervened — has had four years at the helm to fix the problems. His time to demonstrate that he can do so is fast running out.
